The article discusses possible ways of overcoming the environmental crisis. It is based on Šmajs' evolutionary ontological understanding of the environmental crisis of nature, which distinguishes between natural and cultural evolution and demonstrates the opposing relationships between them. It critically develops one of Šmajs' proposals for initiating a biophilic transformation of culture by dealing with some of the consequences of the economic crisis (specifically unemployment).
Ten years ago a Czech environmental philosopher wrote that thinking on the environmental crisis was simply taken for granted, that it had lost its appeal and had become mere words (Kolářský 1993, 929-30) . He added: "It is dangerous, though, when information about a coming catastrophe is simply taken for granted instead of prompting measures that could prevent the catastrophe" (Kolářský 1993, 930) . We have to admit today that nothing at all has changed in this general human approach towards the environmental crisis (which has in the meantime become much more pronounced). Environmental thinking (including environmental philosophy) has not stagnated, however; a multilateral debate has developed and a sufficient number of concepts relating to environmental transformation have been created to prompt a change in thinking even among groups with very miscellaneous ideological foundations. Yet this has achieved nothing; human thinking has not changed. Why not?
The simplest answer is that there has not been enough time to change the thinking. If we select the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference as the milestone marking the point at which the environmental crisis was officially confirmed, we see that only forty years have passed. A new idea, however, needs at least a century, possibly more, to become generally accepted. (Let us add, for the sake of completeness, that except for the idea of consumerism no idea has ever been generally accepted by any society without the use of violence.)
It is also possible that there are obstacles preventing environmental transformation from being accepted. Thinkers (philosophers, scientists, religious and political reformers) can only suggest a particular solution but a change in thinking, for instance, new morals, comes about through the life experiences of people, from an immediately experienced need. An elaborated strategy simply specifies the need and strives to fulfill it. It is quite easy to achieve harmony between highly developed theory and a generally shared life experience because the theory specifies what people already know and proposes solutions that people can immediately understand. Here we are referring to problems, conflicts and crises that emerge from within human society and which are easy for us to understand because people understand each other even when they are in the midst of the fiercest conflict. The environmental crisis though presents us, for the first time in our history, with an "enemy" that we do not understand: it presents us with the system of the biosphere, which is inaccessible to generally shared experience. Its character can be cognized only by high theory. Yet highly abstract theory cannot easily transfer its cognition to life experience for the very reason that life experience cannot see or feel any threat, any need: it cannot find anything in itself that it could base its trust in the knowledge of the abstract theory on. People may, for example, realize that their health, both mental and physical, has continually deteriorated; yet since life experience can see only the coarse macroscopic surface of nature and not its hidden, intricately ordered system, the complicated causal relationship between the deteriorating human health and the disintegration of this system necessarily evades it. Life experience will probably be able to see the threat only when the manifestations of the environmental crisis become much more pronounced. The icebergs that theoreticians claim are being affected are "far away". But if the environment in which people directly ("really") live in were to die in front of their eyes, the threat would become evident. Then they would ask the scientists to provide explanations and proposed solutions; in this case, though, the point at which it would have been possible to avert the environmental catastrophe, will have passed.
Yet there is one more option, which can be deduced from the way the environmental crisis has been overshadowed by the economic crisis. People were able to react quickly to the economic crisis, while the danger that the human species might become extinct, possibly rather soon (potentially affecting the children of young people today and certainly their grandchildren), has not caught their attention. The threat of consumerism disappearing (and this is still far removed from the threat of starvation) has drawn them out into the streets. This could mean that the indifferent reaction of general life experience to the endangerment facing the human species is not caused by lack of knowledge or an inability to recognize the threat. It seems that this reaction is an unspecified, unspecific, theoretically unfounded, and possibly simply instinctive, and yet decisive refusal to take any steps to attempt to prevent the environmental catastrophe. Why? Because such an attempt would necessarily mean giving up consumerism. It seems that we prefer consumerism to any other way of life and that we are so sure about this decision that we are ready to give our lives for it in an environmental catastrophe (and since we must not expressly admit this, the inability to recognize the threat has become the ability to close our eyes in the face of the threat).
How is this possible?
If we are to attempt to answer this question we have to base our deliberations on a deeper understanding of the environmental crisis of nature. We will not make do with merely recognizing its many manifestations and estimating its future progress, as the natural sciences do, or with merely searching for new moral positions on nature and the resulting new moral self-understanding of humans, as most environmental philosophies do. The environmental crisis has to be understood ontologically. And an understanding of this nature can be found in Josef Šmajs' evolutionary ontology. Let us first briefly outline the principal points. Evolutionary ontology distinguishes between two methods of ordering reality: age-old natural evolution and the much later cultural evolution. They are distinct since they each materialize a different type of information, or rather they each order reality according to different rules and different types of cognition. Šmajs understands cognition to be the basic ontic process of living nature: a special type of activity, an activity that living systems use to create and preserve their internal orderliness. Cognition in its own sense means constituting, building and structuring reality.
1 In nature we can distinguish between two different means of external environment cognition: slow and indirect phylogenetic cognition, which accumulates information in the living system's genome and is used in the reproduction of organisms and immediate, current ontogenetic cognition (sense-neuronal), which is stored in the central nervous systems) (CNS) of multicellular animals and is used in behavior relating to self-preservation (Šmajs 2008, 40-41) .
The first method is about three billion years older and is essential to all living beings (including humans). It is in fact a different term for natural evolution. Genetic variability and natural selection are the fundamental principles of natural evolution. The first principle is that of "chance" and the other is the principle of "necessity".
2 Genetic variability is the creation of minor deviations between individual organisms; the uniqueness of each organism is not controlled by a plan or idea of reality, each step is a step into the unknown. Genetic deviations between individual organisms are tiny; phylogenetic cognition progresses slowly, in small steps only. An individual organism is, at the same time, a repetition of steps taken in the past and a new partial step-the organism itself is actually a partial and new piece of knowledge of the phylogenetic cognition. The "correctness" of each of these individual steps is immediately "empirically verified" by means of natural selection: the organism either survives and multiplies (the step is repeatable) or not (this kind of step in phylogenetic cognition disappears, it is not repeatable).
Sensual-neuronal cognition (about half a billion years old)-sensuousness, the nervous system and its activities-was created by phylogenetic cognition and is heralded by it as well: it does not add new information to phylogenetic cognition; it cognizes only that which phylogenetic cognition already "knows": an animal perceives, ascertains in its surroundings what phylogenetic cognition to be able to take for the relevant, phylogenetically based action or reaction. The complexity of the nervous system in humans has phylogenetically increased to such an extent that sensual-neuronal cognition has qualitatively changed: in humans we can observe the appearance of a third type of cognition, which enables a "conceptual interpretation of reality, reflections on the past and the future, a description of abstract relations and the introduction of and criticism of intellectual projects and theories" (Šmajs, Krob 2003, 260) . This third type of cognition, sociocultural cognition, can produce unreal ideas, ideas about a potential new reality, and makes it possible for humans to perform their activities according to these ideas and implement them. This new type of cognition led to the fact that humans as a species, in a relatively short time, changed the way in which they adapt ... they succeeded in moving from their predominant style of adaptation by changing their slow and limited internal biological structure to an aggressive adaptive strategy, to an intentional and quick adaptation of its surroundings. During a short period of time, they created a planetary culture not adapted to nature (Šmajs 1995, 47) .
Why is culture not adapted to nature? Why is it not a "continuation of nature"? It cannot be a continuation since the ways in which nature and culture originated are completely different. The natural system is built slowly and blindly and all the individual and always specific elements participate (both phylogenetically cognizing and phylogenetic knowledge at the same time). It cannot functionally combine with the rapid reconstruction of this system in accordance with the abstract plans of a single biological species. Adaptation of the environment cannot be a continuation of an adaptation to the environment. This is prevented especially by the speed and scope of the sociocultural cognition progress; phylogenetic cognition cannot react to the excessively rapid and substantial modifications in the environment-whenever changes such as these occurred in the past, they resulted in the extinction of a species. Therefore Šmajs characterizes the relationship between the cultural system and the natural system as an opposing relationship. "Reconstructing" parts of the natural system as elements of the cultural system (in the artificial creations of material culture and technology) cannot mean anything other than destruction from the viewpoint of the natural system. 3 3 "All physical cultural structures are shaped from a matter that was shaped by natural evolution. And since this imagined material (dust from ancient stars consisting of elements found in the periodic table) is not available anymore-it has been incorporated into both inanimate and animate forms of planet Earth by natural evolution-matter for building artificial cultural structures may be obtained only by breaking up the unique structures of terrestrial nature. This means that ontical cultural structures originate only from ontical natural structures ... This means, putting it metaphorically, that the culture we humans appreciate so much is actually a shack hastily built from the ruins of the temple of the terrestrial nature that is gradually being demolished." (Šmajs 2008, 31-32) The opposition of culture to nature has not changed the primeval animal dependence of humans on nature in any way. "We depend on the healthy and uncontaminated Earth every time we breathe, every time we drink a cup of water and every time we eat a morsel of food" (Šmajs 2013, 5) . "Independence" from nature (demonstrated by the fact that humans can survive even in environments they are not adapted to, for example) is an illusion that originated in times when humanity was not plentiful and the dispersed culture was not able to weaken the system of nature since it was able to break up only small parts of it; an illusion that has been refuted in the globalized culture by the environmental crisis. 4 Šmajs has a simple answer to the question "How can we stop the crisis?": we have to give way to nature.
5 This means that we have to stop developing the material culture; and moreover, we have to withdraw from many of the already conquered positions. We cannot hope that the catastrophe can be averted by discovering and implementing environmental technologies that would not break up nature and still allow us to preserve material culture in its current or a larger scope (preserve consumerism). In principle this is impossible: nothing that is created by sociocultural cognition can be "correct", i.e. compatible with phylogenetic cognition, unless it takes into account the time that phylogenetic cognition needs to react to it: it would have to be a plan that was implemented slowly, in tiny steps, for hundreds of thousands of years. Attempting something like that would be paradoxical; just consider the human life span. And moreover, our cognition is too limited and cannot see the "spatially" (systemwise) wider and more time-distant relations concerning either the natural system or our own creations.
Under what conditions would such a retreat be possible? In his latest book Šmajs writes: "Probably only qualitative growth in culture, i.e. a dignified retreat and 'growth without growth', is the precondition for a sustainable co-evolution between culture and nature." (Šmajs 2012, 181) What is meant by "qualitative" growth in culture or "growth without growth"? "The former Brazilian Minister of Environment, Jose Lutzenberger, wrote that upon seeing something so majestic as a primeval forest we feel that we must do something about it, introduce progress into it, introduce roads, bridges and planes" quotes Šmajs (1995, 75) . In order to make J. Lutzenberger's observation complete, we have to add that even 4 "Why is it only today, at a time when we have advanced theoretical knowledge of nature and the highlevel planetary technosphere, that culture is failing in its ability to promote human interests, an ability that was already typical of the purest culture of hunting and gathering? Probably because the biological cultural predispositions of humans as a species and also the foundations of culture itself ... corresponded to an entirely different geographical aspect of culture: to dispersed and not very numerous regional cultures that had been integrated by the unweakened biosphere." (Šmajs 1995, 41 ) "The physical globalization of the human culture, i.e. the material-energetic and information interlinking of formerly isolated regions, accompanied by planet-wide migration of people, the rapid exchange of technologies, goods, inventions, services, etc. has brought about a situation the human race has never encountered before. Inside the global biosphere and at the expense of this biosphere, a global technosphere, global economy and global division of labor and human cooperation are all developing. This ... cancels out the beneficial effects of the biosphere on the globalized culture, which has optimized the isolated regional cultures and eliminated social disturbances and crises" (Šmajs 2008, 30) . 5 In his new book Šmajs puts it as follows: "... the predatory relationship of culture towards nature must be replaced by knowledge and thinking that is respectful towards nature, by a careful strategy of a dignified retreat" (Šmajs 2012, 164 ). before we feel compelled to build an airport and a waste dump in a primeval forest, we feel compelled to write a poem about it, compose a symphony and paint a painting. Does Šmajs see "qualitative" growth as being such a purely spiritual "growth" in culture, i.e. "growth" without material growth? Is consumerism replaced by another way of life, a spiritual life where the spirit itself is the agent, material and environment of its own activity, prerequisite for long-term co-evolution between culture and nature? Could it be a pure life of thoughts that would not strive to force ideas on reality (nature)? Humans could remain material beings and they would not have to give up transforming reality (nature) completely. This would not simply be the meaning of their lives, though. It would just be a means of survival-and its scope would be adapted to this very fact. Only as much material culture would be left as is required for the biological survival of humans (without having to give up those elements that make our life relatively less threatened in comparison to the lives of other creatures). The non-material (purely spiritual) culture could then grow limitlessly. It would never "reach the limits of the Earth". It might, however, reach some other limit, though. Almost instinctively we feel that such a major transformation of our way of life is impossible. We have long alluded to the fact that we are more spiritual than physical-and it was just our pride deceiving us. This discussion is not really about the fact that we are also physical beings and not only spiritual beings but about the fact that there is an opposing relationship between "body" and "spirit" (humans have instinctively felt this since long ago): this is an ontical opposition between culture and nature inside humans.
Yet Šmajs frequently emphasizes that there is no conflict between humans and nature, because nature created humans (humans came into existence through natural evolution), but only between nature and culture, because culture was created by humans. Let us take a look at this formulation, for example: Humans are just an ordinary biological species, homogeneous with nature, and therefore scientifically no conflict can be discovered between humans and nature. In contrast to the prevailing belief, I defend the idea that human particularity does not primarily consist in the fact that humans speak, think, learn and believe. I believe that it consists in the fact that humans are the only species that has managed to create an artificial body of its own, its own expanded phenotypeculture (Šmajs 2013, 3 ).
Šmajs quite correctly rejects the idea that humans are some kind of a beyond-nature, supernatural being and emphasizes that culture is not just a spiritual but also a material culture and that humans themselves are much more active than spiritual beings. It is important to realize, though, that it is not the material culture as a materialization of the sociocultural information that is opposed to nature, it is the information itself. Sociocultural information, when not followed by actual interference with nature, does not break up nature.
The human brain, the bearer of sociocultural information, was created by nature. Sociocultural cognition, however, is opposed to phylogenetic cognition. And both these types of cognition also operate inside humans. All that has been said about the relationship between sociocultural and phylogenetic cognitions in general applies specifically also to the relationship between sociocultural cognition and human phylogenetic cognition (which created humans and continues to do so). Sociocultural cognition is no longer a continuation of human phylogenetic cognition and it is not harmoniously interconnected with it: the relationship between sociocultural cognition and human phylogenetic cognition is as much one of opposition as is the relationship with the phylogenetic cognition of all other living creatures (with external nature). After all, Šmajs admits this in the following idea, for example:
only a small part of the human psyche can fully adapt to the artificial cultural environment. That part is the evolutionary youngest functional area of the cerebral cortex where the rational element of the non-biological sociocultural information is encoded, processed and stored...The evolutionarily older structures of the human body and psyche cannot adapt so flexibly to the artificial cultural environment (Šmajs 2008, 59 ).
Sociocultural cognition was able to create culture, but it could not transform humans; it could not transform the part of humans that is shaped by phylogenetic cognition, since phylogenetic cognition does not know anything about changes in the world humans inhabit, about the changes caused by sociocultural cognition, and therefore it cannot react to these changes. Humans in their entirety are not adapted to culture. Humans are phylogenetically adapted to a simple, yet exhausting and perilous life in small groups living in equatorial Africa. A developed culture induces "civilization stress" in humans. This is not only the physical illnesses caused by the convenience of technology for humans, which prevents humans from maintaining or even establishing a healthy physical constitution and by the abundance of food inappropriate to the natural needs of human metabolism. There are also psychological illnesses or at least psychological distress caused by the fact that the complex order of the over populated society is incompatible with the evolutionarily older part of the psyche, which cannot understand it. However, even the growing development of sociocultural cognition is limited phylogenetically. Humans have aggregated enormous amounts of "spiritual wealth", yet all of this wealth is stored in human external memory (in books, etc.), a dead memory, which is brought back to life only by specific individuals when they think of a specific idea. No human, however, can think all thoughts at the same time, comprehend all knowledge and perform the necessary synthesis, since the human brain (or specifically, the relevant part of the grey cerebral cortex) is too small. It can only be expanded phylogenetically (through the same means it was created) yet this has been frustrated by sociocultural cognition. Sociocultural cognition is not capable of impacting on genetic variability but it has suppressed the impact of natural selection. 6 The brain of a human being today is no different from that of a human who saw the light in Africa 150 thousand years ago. And therefore human spiritual wealth only accumulates discontinuously; it is unable to achieve the height or depth that logically pertains to it, yet in reality is denied to it. How can humans live or even decide to live a pure spiritual life, if their spirit has to remain so fragmented? It is actually possible to say that a human being is not an entity at all; it is just a personal union of two types of cognition which are mutually opposed and blocking each other. It seems, though, that in some aspects they actually are connected, or rather, that their effects amplify each other. The phylogenetically conditioned effort to preserve the species, the urgency to occupy as large a living space as possible, to occupy as many food resources as possible and to multiply as much as possible operates in tandem with the restlessness of the spirit, which, since it cannot achieve its logical completeness, strives in vain to replace it with the "implementation" of ideas: this double causation urges humans towards hectic and aimless activity: towards consumerism which is then a full demonstration of the conflicting human essence. Our essence prevents us not only from moving forward but also from going back. The opposing relationship between nature and culture has therefore reached a crisis not only in the biosphere of the planet Earth, but also in humans.
Probably because Šmajs did not search for the opposition between nature and culture inside humans, he relied for a long time on the expectation that humans will be directed towards biophilic transformation by reason, by practicing a real relationship with nature and culture, by realizing the need to give way to nature-that we just have to understand our situation to be able to change it. He wrote that the process of overcoming the crisis will "also depend on the activity of people interested in their own futures. It seems that it will be conditioned by the political will of the public, by the new philosophical orientation of people" (Šmajs 2008, 9-10 ). Yet gradually he has come to realize that it will not work this way. In his new book he writes, for example: "it will be very difficult, even impossible, to give up all the environmentally damaging consumer, cultural and military technologies. One reason is that the current planetary economy is based on mass producing and distributing these technologies" (Šmajs 2012, 69) . And finally, at least silently, he admits, that voluntarily, "democratically", simply on the grounds of knowledge, people will never decide to implement the biophilic transformation-that it is only possible to try and secretly suggest it to them: If ... to the objectively necessary biophilic reconstruction of contemporary predatory culture we also add the urgent need to return full human labor to a biophilic culture, or, for the present, just the limited requirement that employment opportunities be purposefully created for those who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, it seems that we might receive at least silent social support (Šmajs 2012, 219). Let us look at this idea in greater detail and try and specify the individual points, or rather, finish what has merely been hinted at. Šmajs' proposal has one great advantage: it is not one of those complicated, long-term and elaborate plans that never succeed-it relies on taking advantage of a specific moment in the breakdown of the current anti-nature economy, a breakdown that is spontaneously underway. Mass unemployment has been caused by the fact that "it is production-oriented scientific and technological progress that has taken away people's productive labor over the past few decades" (Šmajs 2013, 5) . The old dream that machines will remove drudgery for people has not come true. Quite the contrary, machines have taken people away from production:
Abiotic automation in the manufacturing sphere, i.e. the seemingly beneficial new-age orientation of science and capital towards the exploitation of inanimate natural powers, limits the need for traditional human labor to a minimum (Šmajs 2012, 183) .
That means that profit is not created by exploiting people anymore, it is created by exploiting nature. This type of economy has no need for human labor; it needs ultimate personal consumption, i.e. consumerism. 7 Here you can see an immediate problem: when people have no jobs, they cannot earn money and therefore they cannot buy the goods (manufactured through fully automated production), or they can buy less and less. Personal consumption is declining right in front of our eyes. The manufacturing costs in a factory that does not need people may be low but if the manufacturer fails to sell the goods, what kind of profit will be earned? It seems simple: profits will decline under these circumstances until they disappear altogether. However, economic activity is accompanied by speculative financial markets that distort and cover up the whole problem with their quantitative abstractions and calculations ... the volume of financial trading greatly exceeds the volume of goods and services produced and provides entrepreneurs with higher profits than the traditional economy (Šmajs 2012, 183). This means that profits are earned purely through financial operations.
8 In other words: reality has been replaced by fiction. The collapse of this type of economy is unavoidable and these fictions only camouflage it and slightly postpone it. The current economic crisis is the first phase of this collapse. In subsequent phases the situation may slip out of the financial oligarchy's control: the financial oligarchy will not be able to use its power as irrevocably as it can today. It may not be able to prevent spontaneous attempts to regenerate anymore, attempts that will occur in various places on the Earth (in a "decentralized way"), yet in the very area crucial for survival and for which a majority of people have natural qualifications (see Šmajs 2012, 183) and to which technological automation never really applied: 9 This may become the reason why historically proven traditional agricultural technology, which once pushed humanity above the level of a mere animal-like dependence on nature, could once again become the point of a positive cultural transformation. Decentralizing an appropriately biotically and abiotically mechanized agriculture..., which would make it possible for an ableto-work population to return to the countryside, would not therefore be a way back: it would be a hopeful way out of the contemporary cultural-existential crisis (Šmajs 2012, 218) .
7 "Upon the establishment of a society of plenty (Galbraith)...something also changes in the relationship towards labor. The economic system starts to ostentatiously despise labor and nature since it can see that it is driven by ultimate personal consumption...The untenability of the assumption that only human labor is the source of material wealth has therefore been unexpectedly revealed by the growth in labor productivity accompanied by the decreasing numbers of available jobs" (Šmajs 2012, 204-5) . 8 "It is well known that contemporary national states are regional and weak and that businesses and banks are global and strong and there has therefore long been insufficient political control over the economic processes, including the financial sector. When banks lend money to repay credit held in other banks it may be that after a series of such steps no-one in any country (also at the planetary level, however) will know how much money is actually in circulation. For efficient political control over economies it would be logical for the volume of money to approximately equal the volume of goods produced and services provided. However, the volume of money is far higher because this is how the anonymous power of large corporations and both local and worldwide financial oligarchies works" (Šmajs 2012, 126-7) . 9 "It is depressing and sad to see how mechanical and automated technologies are used in the largescale breeding of livestock, in feeding, reproduction, chemical treatment, transportation, killing and 'industrial processing at slaughterhouses' (Šmajs 2012, 199 ). The industrial model of increasing labor productivity "in agriculture has damaged not only the soil but also crop planting and animal breeding and caused dangerous contamination of food by foreign substances" (Šmajs 2012, 218 ).
It would not be a "return" to medieval drudgery since many more people can share the drudgery today (and Šmajs moreover allows for appropriate mechanization). And it would not even be "artificial employment", because agriculture, which involves work with living things, needs human labor: automation has not proved its worth-it can produce only low-quality or even harmful food.-And this way out, of the economic crisis first of all and gradually out of the environmental crisis (since the return to the countryside, the necessary adaptation of human agricultural labor to the variability of the natural ecosystems would bring people closer to nature) will not be adopted before the current need to simply limit consumerism turns into real misery.
10 To sum up: people will not voluntarily give up consumerism, yet they will lose it involuntarily in an economic crisis, at the collapse of the anti-nature economyand this is the very moment when it will be possible to attempt the biophilic transformation of culture. Here you can see another great advantage of Šmajs' proposal: a change in the philosophical orientation is not prerequisite nor is it the starting point for a change in the way of life-it proceeds along with it and occurs consequently at the same time and subsequently affirms and strengthens the new way of life (this type of change in thinking is most effective and longest lasting). There is one flaw in this promising proposal, though: it presumes an excess of good will in people, in humans as a biological species. This presumption is not in accordance with the ambivalent essence of humans, however. One more possible solution should be mentioned here, a solution that does not make this presumption-a solution we hate to even think about and do not want to admit-and yet it is a way of dealing with problems that we have always used and still use today-intra-species violence. Should a large section of humanity die in the coming war over resources (and should, against all probability, there be no use of weapons that kill not only people but ravage nature as well), then the cultural burden on nature would significantly decrease (and the economy would dispense with unnecessary people), balance would be reestablished and the surviving small number of people would not only avoid environmental catastrophe, they could keep consuming for some time, temporarily. However, even this "solution" will probably not succeed: not because humans are not able to implement it but because it is probably too late.
I think that the extinction of the human species will be a "principal solution", or rather a natural consequence of the environmental crisis: the human species is internally inconsistent and impossible to preserve. Both this internal conflict and the conflict between humans (or culture) and external nature have been intensifying throughout the existence of our species, slowly initially and very quickly in the New Age. Today it has come to its natural and logical conclusion (the demise of our species is necessary from the viewpoint of nature and also from the viewpoint of culture). A biophilic transformation of culture would pause or defer this necessity-but, in a "non-principal way". It is impossible to ever achieve complete compatibility between humans and nature; it might be possible to achieve it through compromise, which means repeatedly. Note that Šmajs' proposal for the beginning of the biophilic transformation of culture does not absolutely rule out a later return of anti-nature culture. This is because the transformation is initiated from the outside, involuntarily, due to economic insufficiency. Every subsequent development of culture will contain the potential for a future anti-nature transformation. Prolonging the existence of the human species would therefore result in never-ending strife between the pro-and anti-nature aspects of culture. At this point we have to correct Šmajs' concept of humans: by acknowledging, or even emphasizing, the irremovable conflict inside our own essence we simultaneously realize that should we attempt a biophilic transformation of culture, we will never achieve final victory and we must not ever start believing in such an option.
